Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) WiFi authentication: Enterprise integration guide
This technical guide provides network engineers, IT architects, and systems administrators with an authoritative blueprint for integrating Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) with enterprise 802.1X WiFi infrastructure. Learn how to eliminate on-premises RADIUS servers, deploy passwordless EAP-TLS certificates via Microsoft Intune SCEP and Cloud PKI, and automate dynamic VLAN assignment using Entra ID security groups.
Video overview
Part of our core series: Enterprise WiFi Security Guide →
- Executive Summary
- Architectural Comparison: Entra ID WiFi Authentication Methods
- Method 1: Cloud-Native EAP-TLS via Microsoft Intune SCEP (Recommended)
- Intune SCEP deployment workflow
- Method 2: Cloud RADIUS with Entra ID OAuth & SCIM Directory Synchronization
- How Cloud RADIUS integrates with Microsoft Entra ID
- Key advantages of Cloud RADIUS
- Dynamic VLAN Assignment via Entra ID Security Groups
- Required RADIUS standard attributes (RFC 2868)
- Captive Portal Single Sign-On (SSO) for Guests, BYOD & Contractors
- Captive portal SSO security benefits
- Hardening Enterprise WiFi Security: WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode
- Troubleshooting Entra ID 802.1X WiFi Authentication Failures
- 1. EAP-TLS handshake failure: Unknown CA or certificate untrusted
- 2. RADIUS Access-Reject: User account disabled or group membership mismatch
- 3. Dynamic VLAN assignment not taking effect
- Summary & Next Steps
Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) WiFi Architecture & Sizing Advisor
Select your organization’s identity licensing, device fleet, and compliance requirements to generate a tailored 802.1X / Cloud RADIUS deployment blueprint and configuration checklist.
Devices receive unique X.509 client certificates pushed via Microsoft Intune SCEP. When connecting to the corporate SSID, the wireless controller forwards EAP-TLS handshakes to a Cloud RADIUS endpoint that validates certificates against Entra ID directory status in real time.
RADIUS Attribute & SCEP Deployment Checklist

Executive Summary
As enterprise IT organisations migrate corporate identity from on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory), network architects face a fundamental networking challenge: Microsoft Entra ID does not support native RADIUS protocol authentication.
Legacy enterprise wireless networks rely on IEEE 802.1X with PEAP-MSCHAPv2, querying on-premises Windows Server Network Policy Server (NPS) instances that validate NT LAN Manager (NTLM) password hashes against local domain controllers. Cloud-native Entra ID does not expose LDAP (TCP 389) or RADIUS (UDP 1812) listening ports, nor does it store plain-text or reversible NTLM password hashes for cloud-only accounts.
To secure enterprise WiFi with Microsoft Entra ID, organisations must modernise their access layer. This technical guide outlines the three proven architectural patterns for connecting Entra ID to enterprise wireless networks:
- Cloud-Native EAP-TLS via Microsoft Cloud PKI & SCEP (Recommended): Passwordless, mutual certificate authentication deployed via Microsoft Intune.
- Cloud RADIUS with Entra ID OAuth / SCIM Directory Sync: Managed cloud authentication service querying the Microsoft Graph API.
- Hybrid On-Premises NPS with Azure MFA Extension: Bridge architecture for environments retaining local Active Directory infrastructure.
Architectural Comparison: Entra ID WiFi Authentication Methods
Before selecting an integration path, evaluate the technical capabilities, security posture, and administrative requirements of each model:
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Microsoft Entra ID WiFi Architecture Matrix |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Method | Protocol | Credential Type | On-Premises Footprint | Security Level (0-100)|
+----------------------+----------+------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| 1. Intune SCEP PKI | EAP-TLS | X.509 Digital CA | Zero (100% Cloud) | 98/100 (Zero Trust) |
| 2. Cloud RADIUS API | EAP-TTLS | Entra ID / SCIM | Zero (100% Cloud) | 88/100 (Enterprise) |
| 3. Hybrid NPS + MFA | PEAPv0 | Username/Pass | Windows Server & NDES | 68/100 (Legacy Risk) |
| 4. Captive Portal SSO| HTTPS/OIDC| Entra ID OAuth | Zero (100% Cloud) | 85/100 (Guest/BYOD) |
+----------------------+----------+------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
Method 1: Cloud-Native EAP-TLS via Microsoft Intune SCEP (Recommended)
Certificate-based EAP-TLS (RFC 5216) represents the gold standard for enterprise wireless security. By issuing unique digital certificates to managed endpoints, organizations eliminate shared passwords, defeat credential-harvesting phishing campaigns, and comply with NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture standards.
+------------------+ +------------------------+ +------------------------+
| Managed Device | | Wireless Access Point | | Cloud RADIUS Server |
| (Win 11 / macOS) | | (Cisco / Meraki/ Aruba)| | (Multi-Region) |
+------------------+ +------------------------+ +------------------------+
| | |
| 1. 802.1X EAP-TLS Assoc | |
|------------------------------->| |
| | 2. RADIUS Access-Request (UDP 1812)|
| |----------------------------------->|
| | | 3. Validate Cert Chain
| | | & Query Graph API
| | | for Account Status
| | 4. RADIUS Access-Accept |
| | (RFC 2868 VLAN Attributes) |
| |<-----------------------------------|
| 5. 802.11 4-Way Handshake | |
|<------------------------------>| |
| | |
[ Encrypted Session Established (WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit) ]
Intune SCEP deployment workflow
- Certificate Authority Setup: Establish an Issuing CA using Microsoft Cloud PKI in Microsoft Intune or an integrated cloud CA (such as SCEPman, EZCA, or Cloud RADIUS PKI).
- Trusted Certificate Profile: Deploy the Root CA and Intermediate CA public certificates to all target Windows 11, macOS, iOS, and Android device groups.
- SCEP Profile Configuration:
- Certificate Type: User or Device certificate.
- Subject Name Format:
CN={{UserName}},OU=WiFi,DC=enterprise,DC=com - Subject Alternative Name (SAN):
UserPrincipalName = {{UserPrincipalName}}andDNS = {{AADDeviceId}} - Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment.
- Key Storage Provider (KSP): TPM preferred (enforces hardware-backed private keys).
- WiFi Configuration Profile:
- WiFi Type: Enterprise.
- EAP Type: EAP-TLS.
- Server Trust: Select the deployed Trusted Root CA certificate.
- Server Names: Enter the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the Cloud RADIUS server (e.g.
radius.purple.ai). - Authentication Identity: User or Machine certificate.
Method 2: Cloud RADIUS with Entra ID OAuth & SCIM Directory Synchronization
For organizations seeking centralized directory management without managing private CAs, Cloud RADIUS provides a managed bridge between wireless controllers and the Microsoft Graph API.
How Cloud RADIUS integrates with Microsoft Entra ID
+--------------------+ +--------------------+ +--------------------+
| Enterprise WLC / | | Cloud RADIUS Engine| | Microsoft Entra ID |
| Access Points | | (Purple Platform) | | (Graph REST API) |
+--------------------+ +--------------------+ +--------------------+
| | |
| 1. RADIUS Access-Request | |
| (User: alex@corp.com) | |
|---------------------------->| |
| | 2. Graph API Query |
| | (Check user enabled, |
| | group memberships, |
| | conditional access) |
| |---------------------------->|
| | |
| | 3. JSON Response |
| | (Status: Active, |
| | Groups: [SG-Finance]) |
| |<----------------------------|
| | |
| 4. RADIUS Access-Accept | |
| (VLAN ID: 40) | |
|<----------------------------| |
Key advantages of Cloud RADIUS
- Zero On-Premises Hardware: Eliminates physical server procurement, Windows Server licensing, and annual OS patch maintenance.
- Real-Time Directory Sync: If an employee leaves the company or is disabled in Entra ID, their wireless access is revoked immediately across all global sites.
- Multi-Region Redundancy: Anycast IP routing forwards authentication requests to the lowest-latency geographical data centre with automatic failover.
Got questions about your specific setup?
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Dynamic VLAN Assignment via Entra ID Security Groups
Dynamic VLAN assignment allows network administrators to broadcast a single corporate SSID while automatically placing devices into isolated network segments based on user roles and department affiliations.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Microsoft Entra ID Security Group |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | |
v v v
[ SG-WiFi-Executive ] [ SG-WiFi-Engineering ] [ SG-WiFi-Contractors ]
| | |
v v v
[ Cloud RADIUS Policy ] [ Cloud RADIUS Policy ] [ Cloud RADIUS Policy ]
| | |
v v v
RADIUS RFC 2868: RADIUS RFC 2868: RADIUS RFC 2868:
• Tunnel-Type = 13 (VLAN) • Tunnel-Type = 13 (VLAN) • Tunnel-Type = 13 (VLAN)
• Tunnel-Medium-Type = 6 • Tunnel-Medium-Type = 6 • Tunnel-Medium-Type = 6
• Group-ID = "10" • Group-ID = "20" • Group-ID = "30"
| | |
v v v
(Corporate Exec VLAN 10) (Engineering Subnet VLAN 20) (Contractor DMZ VLAN 30)
Required RADIUS standard attributes (RFC 2868)
When the Cloud RADIUS server approves an authentication request, it includes three standard attributes in the Access-Accept packet:
| RADIUS Attribute | Attribute Number | Type | Example Value | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Tunnel-Type |
64 | Integer / Tagged | 13 (VLAN) |
Specifies that the tunnel is a Virtual Local Area Network. |
Tunnel-Medium-Type |
65 | Integer / Tagged | 6 (802) |
Specifies IEEE 802 standard framing (Ethernet/WLAN). |
Tunnel-Private-Group-ID |
81 | String | "20" |
The target VLAN ID or VLAN Name configured on the access point switch trunk. |
Captive Portal Single Sign-On (SSO) for Guests, BYOD & Contractors
For guest visitors, vendors, and unmanaged employee personal devices (BYOD), 802.1X certificate deployment is often impractical. In these scenarios, a cloud-managed Captive Portal integrated with Microsoft Entra ID via SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect (OIDC) provides a secure, audited onboarding workflow.
+--------------------+ +--------------------+ +--------------------+
| Guest / BYOD | | Purple Captive | | Microsoft Entra ID |
| Browser | | Splash Portal | | Login Gateway |
+--------------------+ +--------------------+ +--------------------+
| | |
| 1. HTTP Web Request | |
|---------------------------->| |
| 2. Redirect to Splash Page | |
|<----------------------------| |
| | |
| 3. Click "Log in with M365" | |
|---------------------------->| |
| 4. SAML / OAuth Auth Request| |
| (login.microsoftonline.com) |
|---------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| 5. MFA Challenge & Identity Verification (Entra ID) |
|<--------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| 6. SAML Assertion / ID Token Issued |
|<----------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| 7. POST Token to Splash Engine |
|---------------------------->| |
| | 8. Authorize MAC on WLC |
| 9. Internet Access Granted |<----------------------------|
|<----------------------------|
Captive portal SSO security benefits
- Enforce Conditional Access: Require Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Terms of Use acceptance before granting network access.
- Automated Expiration: Restrict visitor access duration (e.g. 8 hours) automatically based on guest identity profiles.
- Audit Logging: Maintain immutable connection records tying physical MAC addresses to corporate Entra ID email addresses for compliance audits.
Hardening Enterprise WiFi Security: WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode
When configuring Microsoft Entra ID WiFi authentication, network architects should configure WPA3-Enterprise to protect against sophisticated over-the-air attack vectors:
- 192-bit Security Mode (CNSA Suite): Implements 256-bit Galois/Counter Mode Protocol (GCMP-256) encryption and 384-bit HMAC-SHA-384 key derivation.
- Protected Management Frames (PMF / IEEE 802.11w): Prevents malicious actors from spoofing access point MAC addresses to send fake deauthentication and disassociation frames.
- Elimination of Legacy Ciphers: Completely deprecates WEP, TKIP, and unhardened WPA2-TKIP suites.
Troubleshooting Entra ID 802.1X WiFi Authentication Failures
When client devices fail to authenticate, consult this systematic diagnostic guide:
1. EAP-TLS handshake failure: Unknown CA or certificate untrusted
- Symptom: Client fails to connect; RADIUS log displays
TLS Alert: unknown_ca (48). - Root Cause: The client device does not trust the RADIUS server certificate, or the RADIUS server lacks the Root CA that issued the client certificate.
- Remediation:
- Confirm the Intune Trusted Certificate profile has deployed the Root CA to the client device.
- In the Intune WiFi profile, verify the server name in the
Server Nameswhitelist matches the Common Name (CN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of the RADIUS server certificate exactly. - Ensure the complete certificate chain (Root CA + Intermediate CAs) is imported into the Cloud RADIUS certificate trust store.
2. RADIUS Access-Reject: User account disabled or group membership mismatch
- Symptom: RADIUS server receives request but returns
Access-Rejectwith errorUser account not found or disabled. - Root Cause: The user account is disabled in Microsoft Entra ID, or the user is not a member of the authorized Entra security group.
- Remediation:
- Inspect the user object in the Microsoft Entra admin center (
entra.microsoft.com) to verify account status is active. - Verify the Cloud RADIUS Enterprise App permissions in Entra ID (
User.Read.All,GroupMember.Read.All). - Check directory synchronization latency if the user was recently added to a new security group.
- Inspect the user object in the Microsoft Entra admin center (
3. Dynamic VLAN assignment not taking effect
- Symptom: Authentication succeeds, but client remains on the default native VLAN instead of the assigned department VLAN.
- Root Cause: The wireless LAN controller (WLC) has not enabled AAA Override, or the switch trunk port is missing the target VLAN ID.
- Remediation:
- On Cisco Catalyst / Aruba controllers, enable AAA Override and Allow Dynamic VLANs on the WLAN configuration.
- Verify the switch port connecting to the access point allows all dynamic VLAN IDs on the 802.1Q trunk (
switchport trunk allowed vlan add 10,20,30,40). - Confirm RADIUS returns all three required attributes:
Tunnel-Type = 13,Tunnel-Medium-Type = 6, andTunnel-Private-Group-ID = <VLAN_ID>.
Summary & Next Steps
Integrating Microsoft Entra ID with enterprise WiFi creates a resilient, passwordless network access layer. By pairing Microsoft Intune SCEP certificate management with Cloud RADIUS and dynamic VLAN assignment, IT organisations eliminate on-premises infrastructure debt while strengthening their zero-trust security posture.
For organizations managing high volumes of guest visitors, contractors, or BYOD hardware alongside corporate fleets, Purple delivers turnkey cloud WiFi access management, native Entra ID SAML/OAuth captive portal single sign-on, and real-time network analytics across all major enterprise wireless hardware vendors.
Key Definitions
Microsoft Entra ID
Microsoft cloud-based identity and access management service (formerly Azure Active Directory) that manages user identities, credentials, conditional access policies, and group memberships.
Serves as the authoritative cloud identity provider for enterprise WiFi authentication and single sign-on.
IEEE 802.1X
An IEEE standard for port-based Network Access Control (PNAC) providing protected authentication for devices attempting to attach to a wireless LAN.
Defines the framework connecting the wireless client (supplicant), access point (authenticator), and RADIUS server (authentication server).
EAP-TLS (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security)
An IETF standard (RFC 5216) mutual authentication protocol utilizing X.509 digital certificates on both client and server to establish an encrypted TLS tunnel.
Eliminates shared passwords and credential theft risks across corporate WiFi networks.
Cloud RADIUS
A cloud-hosted Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service server that bridges modern cloud identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Google) with enterprise network infrastructure.
Replaces on-premises Windows Server Network Policy Server (NPS) clusters with scalable, multi-region cloud authentication endpoints.
SCEP (Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol)
A standard public key cryptography protocol (RFC 8894) that enables mobile device management (MDM) platforms to automatically request and issue client certificates.
Allows Microsoft Intune to provision X.509 WiFi certificates silently to Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android endpoints.
Microsoft Cloud PKI
A fully cloud-hosted public key infrastructure service integrated into Microsoft Intune for issuing and managing certificate lifecycles.
Removes the requirement to maintain on-premises Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) servers.
Dynamic VLAN assignment
A network access control mechanism where the RADIUS server returns vendor-specific attributes or RFC 2868 attributes upon authentication to assign a client to a specific VLAN.
Enables zero-trust role-based access control by placing users into isolated network segments based on Entra ID security groups.
Worked Examples
A global enterprise with 4,500 employees across 12 regional offices is decommissioning on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) in favour of Microsoft Entra ID P2 and Microsoft Intune. Corporate devices include 3,200 Windows 11 laptops and 1,300 macOS endpoints. How should the network team architect passwordless 802.1X enterprise WiFi without deploying on-premises servers?
- Certificate Infrastructure: Deploy Microsoft Cloud PKI in Intune to establish a dedicated Issuing CA for wireless access. 2. SCEP Profile Configuration: Create an Intune SCEP certificate profile targeting all managed devices, configuring Subject Name as
CN={{UserName}}and Subject Alternative Name (SAN) asUserPrincipalName={{UserPrincipalName}}. 3. WiFi Profile Deployment: Push an Intune WiFi configuration profile with WPA3-Enterprise, EAP-TLS authentication, and the Trusted Root CA certificate. 4. Cloud RADIUS Integration: Connect wireless controllers (Cisco Catalyst 9800 / Aruba Central) to a multi-region Cloud RADIUS service configured with Entra ID enterprise application single sign-on. 5. Verification: Validate that client handshakes complete silently in under 200ms using EAP-TLS without prompting users for passwords.
A regional healthcare organisation operates 8 hospitals with clinical staff, administrative personnel, and visiting contractors sharing access points. The network team must enforce strict role-based network segmentation using a single corporate SSID. How is dynamic VLAN assignment configured with Microsoft Entra ID and Cloud RADIUS?
- Entra Security Groups: Create three dedicated security groups:
SG-WiFi-ClinicalStaff,SG-WiFi-Admin, andSG-WiFi-Contractors. 2. RADIUS Policy Mapping: In the Cloud RADIUS policy engine, define group-to-VLAN rules:SG-WiFi-ClinicalStaff-> VLAN 20 (Clinical Subnet 10.20.0.0/22),SG-WiFi-Admin-> VLAN 30 (Admin Subnet 10.30.0.0/24),SG-WiFi-Contractors-> VLAN 40 (Contractor Subnet 172.16.40.0/24). 3. RFC 2868 Attributes: Configure Cloud RADIUS to return standard IETF attributes on Access-Accept:Tunnel-Type = 13 (VLAN),Tunnel-Medium-Type = 6 (802),Tunnel-Private-Group-ID = <VLAN_ID>. 4. WLC & Switch Configuration: Enable AAA override / Dynamic VLAN Assignment on the wireless LAN controller and tag VLANs 20, 30, and 40 on all AP trunk ports.
Practice Questions
Q1. Why does Microsoft Entra ID fail to authenticate legacy 802.1X PEAP-MSCHAPv2 requests directly from a standard wireless access point?
Hint: Consider the cryptographic hashes stored in cloud directories versus on-premises NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hashes.
View model answer
Legacy PEAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication relies on NT LAN Manager (NTLM) password hashes to perform the challenge-handshake authentication protocol. Microsoft Entra ID is a cloud identity service that does not store or expose raw NTLM password hashes for cloud-only users. Furthermore, Entra ID does not support inbound RADIUS (UDP 1812) or LDAP (TCP 389) queries. As a result, 802.1X wireless requests must use certificate-based EAP-TLS or route through a Cloud RADIUS service integrated via OAuth/API tokens.
Q2. An Intune-enrolled Windows 11 device receives its SCEP certificate successfully but fails to authenticate to the corporate 802.1X WiFi network. The RADIUS log displays error: "EAP-TLS handshake failed: Unknown CA or certificate chain untrusted". What is the root cause and remediation?
Hint: Examine the certificate trust anchors deployed to both the client and the RADIUS server.
View model answer
This error occurs when the RADIUS server does not possess the Trusted Root Certificate Authority (CA) that signed the client SCEP certificate, or the client does not trust the server certificate presented by the RADIUS server. Remediation requires: 1) Uploading the Root CA and intermediate CA public certificates from Microsoft Cloud PKI / SCEP into the Cloud RADIUS trusted certificate store; 2) Deploying a Trusted Certificate profile in Intune pushing the RADIUS server root certificate to the Windows 11 client; 3) Specifying the exact server certificate Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the Intune WiFi profile Server Names list.
Q3. How do you prevent RADIUS timeout issues when using Microsoft Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) on wireless networks?
Hint: Analyze client handshake timeout budgets compared to human interactive MFA response times.
View model answer
Standard 802.1X wireless supplicants and access points enforce strict EAP handshake timeouts (typically 5 to 10 seconds). When an on-premises NPS server with the Azure MFA extension requests mobile push notifications or phone prompts, the user rarely responds within 10 seconds, causing the wireless controller to drop the connection. To prevent this: 1) Migrate corporate managed devices to passwordless EAP-TLS certificates, which satisfy zero-trust identity compliance without interactive prompts; 2) For BYOD and guest onboarding, use a captive portal with web-based Entra ID OAuth single sign-on (SSO), where browser timeouts support interactive MFA before network access is granted.
Frequently asked questions
Can Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) act as a direct RADIUS server for WiFi?
No. Microsoft Entra ID is a cloud identity provider communicating via HTTP REST APIs (Microsoft Graph, SAML, OIDC) and does not provide native RADIUS listening services (UDP 1812/1813). To authenticate enterprise WiFi with Entra ID, organizations deploy a Cloud RADIUS service or use Microsoft Intune SCEP to issue EAP-TLS client certificates validated against Entra ID.
What is the difference between EAP-TLS and PEAP-MSCHAPv2 with Entra ID?
EAP-TLS uses mutual X.509 digital certificates on both the client device and the RADIUS server, providing passwordless security resistant to credential theft and man-in-the-middle attacks. PEAP-MSCHAPv2 relies on usernames and passwords, which cannot be validated directly by Entra ID without maintaining on-premises Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) and NPS infrastructure.
How does dynamic VLAN assignment work with Microsoft Entra ID?
When a user or managed device connects to the 802.1X SSID, the Cloud RADIUS server evaluates the user group memberships in Entra ID. Upon successful authentication, RADIUS returns RFC 2868 attributes (Tunnel-Type, Tunnel-Medium-Type, Tunnel-Private-Group-ID) instructing the wireless access point to assign the client device to a specific isolated VLAN.
How do you deploy WiFi certificates to mobile devices using Microsoft Intune?
In Microsoft Intune, administrators configure two configuration profiles: 1) A Trusted Certificate profile deploying the Root CA public key; 2) A SCEP Certificate profile that requests client certificates from Microsoft Cloud PKI or an external SCEP server using the device Azure AD Device ID or User Principal Name (UPN). Intune then pushes a WiFi configuration profile that references the SCEP certificate.
Can guest visitors authenticate using Microsoft Entra ID single sign-on?
Yes. Purple captive portal solutions integrate with Microsoft Entra ID via SAML 2.0 or OAuth 2.0. When visitors or contractors connect to the guest SSID, the splash page redirects them to the organization branded Microsoft login portal, where they authenticate using their corporate Entra credentials before receiving controlled guest network access.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-207 - Zero Trust Architecture
- Microsoft Learn - Microsoft Entra ID Authentication & Intune SCEP Overview
- IETF RFC 5216 - The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol
- IETF RFC 2865 - Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)
- IETF RFC 2868 - RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support (VLAN Tagging)
- Purple - Enterprise WiFi Security Guide
- Purple - Cloud RADIUS vs On-Premises RADIUS
Continue reading in this series
Sophos Firewall and guest WiFi: captive portal setup with Purple
How Purple's cloud guest WiFi works with Sophos Firewall and its access points through a standard external captive portal and RADIUS, and where to check support and find the steps.
Aruba Central and Purple WiFi: Cloud-Managed Integration
A comprehensive technical reference guide for integrating Aruba Central with Purple's cloud-hosted guest WiFi intelligence platform. This guide covers architecture, step-by-step configuration of external captive portals and RADIUS, and multi-site rollout strategies for enterprise IT teams.
Okta and RADIUS: Extending Your Identity Provider to WiFi Authentication
This guide provides a comprehensive technical reference for IT administrators at Okta-centric organisations who want to extend their cloud identity provider to WiFi authentication using the Okta RADIUS agent. It covers the full authentication architecture, MFA enforcement trade-offs, dynamic VLAN assignment via RADIUS attribute mapping, and the critical decision between password-based EAP-TTLS and certificate-based EAP-TLS. Venue operators and enterprise IT teams will find actionable deployment guidance, real-world case studies from hospitality and retail, and a clear framework for integrating Okta RADIUS alongside dedicated guest WiFi solutions.
Got questions about your specific setup?
Our team works with venue operators, IT managers, and network engineers across 80,000 venues. Book a 20-minute call and we will show you how others like you solved it.